Jurisdiction, in its broadest sense, means the power to hear and determine causes. Jurisdiction is generally divided into two components: subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction. Subject matter jurisdiction is the of a court to try actions of the type or class to which a suit belongs. Personal jurisdiction is the authority of a court over parties and properties. Stated another way, subject matter jurisdiction addresses whether a court has the authority to hear a particular type of suit, while personal jurisdiction addresses whether state and federal due process requirements are met based on the person's or property's relationship to the state. The term "jurisdiction" does not have a single, fixed meaning, but has different meanings in different situations [St. Sava Mission Corp. v. Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese (1990) 223 Cal. App. 3d 1354, 1365, 273 Cal. Rptr. 340].
The word "jurisdiction," in its judicial sense, means the power to hear and determine causes [Mueller v. Elba Oil Co.(1942) 21 Cal. 2d 188, 206, 130 P.2d 961; Gray v. Hall (1928) 203 Cal. 306, 314-315, 265 P. 246; see also In re Hughes (1911) 159 Cal. 360, 363, 113 P. 684 (jurisdiction, as applied to a particular claim or controversy, is the power to hear and determine that controversy); Crew v. Pratt (1897) 119 Cal. 139, 151, 51 P. 38 (jurisdiction to pronounce judgment or order under Code Civ. Proc. § 1908, relating to conclusiveness and effect of judgment, refers to the court's right or power to adjudicate a point); Ex Parte Bennett (1872) 44 Cal. 84, 88 (jurisdiction is the power to hear and determine, but includes the power to do both, to hear without determining, or to determine without hearing); Burns v. Municipal Court (1961) 195 Cal. App. 2d 596, 599, 16 Cal. Rptr. 64 (jurisdiction is the power of a court to hear and determine, or to act in a certain manner, and is synonymous with the power to render a valid judgment against a person)].
Jurisdiction is, however, a term of large and comprehensive import and embraces every kind of judicial action. Thus, every movement by a court is necessarily the exercise of jurisdiction [Harrington v. Superior Court (1924) 194 Cal. 185, 188, 228 P. 15] . The term embraces a large number of ideas of similar character, some fundamental to the nature of any judicial system, some derived from the requirement of due process, some determined by the constitutional or statutory structure of a particular court, and some based on mere procedural rules originally devised for convenience and efficiency, and by precedent made mandatory and jurisdictional [Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal (1941) 17 Cal. 2d 280, 291 109 P.2d 942] .
Excess of jurisdiction refers to a situation in which a court has jurisdiction in the fundamental sense over the subject matter and the parties, but exercises that jurisdiction in an unauthorized manner, that is, in excess of the authority possessed [see Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal (1941) 17 Cal. 2d 280, 291 109 P.2d 942; In re Jody R. (1990) 218 Cal. App. 3d 1615, 1622, 267 Cal. Rptr. 746; People v. Ruiz (1990) 217 Cal. App. 3d 574, 584, 265 Cal. Rptr. 886; Jones v. World Life Research Institute (1976) 60 Cal. App. 3d 836, 846, 131 Cal. Rptr. 674; see also People v. National Automobile & Casualty Co. (2000) 82 Cal. App. 4th 120, 125-126, 97 Cal. Rptr. 2d 858; Lovett v. Carrasco (1998) 63 Cal. App. 4th 48, 54-55, 73 Cal. Rptr. 2d 496]. For example, a court may grant relief that it is not authorized to grant, or it may act in the absence of certain procedural prerequisites. Such acts are strictly in excess of jurisdiction, although in common usage they are frequently not distinguished from acts in which the court wholly lacks jurisdiction [see Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal (1941) 17 Cal. 2d 280, 288, 109 P.2d 942; People v. Nat'l Automobile and Casualty Ins. Co. (2000) 82 Cal. App. 4th 120, 125, 97 Cal. Rptr. 2d 858; Jovine v. FHP, Inc. (1998) 64 Cal. App. 4th 1506, 1527 n.26, 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d 322; see also Crittenden v. Superior Court (1964) 61 Cal. 2d 565, 567, 39 Cal. Rptr. 380, 393 P.2d 692; Schwenke v. J & P Scott, Inc. (1988) 205 Cal. App. 3d 71, 76, 252 Cal. Rptr. 91 ; compare Jovine v. FHP, Inc. (1998) 64 Cal. App. 4th 1506, 1527, 1531-1532, 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d 322 (while it is not uncommon for cases to state that act in excess of court's jurisdiction is void, only acts in excess of subject matter jurisdiction are void, while acts in excess of other kinds of jurisdiction are voidable) with Plaza Hollister Ltd. Partnership v. County of San Benito (1999) 72 Cal. App. 4th 1, 20, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 715 (granting relief that court under no circumstances has any authority to grant has been considered an aspect of fundamental jurisdiction for purposes of declaring a judgment or order void)].
Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Subject matter jurisdiction has been defined as the authority of a court to try actions of the type or class to which a suit belongs. A question of subject matter jurisdiction necessarily involves choice of forum: since all legally cognizable grievances may be considered in some forum, a claim that a particular agency has or does not have authority to adjudicate a case inevitably implies that another court or agency does not have or does have such power [Hughes v. Blue Cross of Northern California (1989) 215 Cal. App. 3d 832, 849, 263 Cal. Rptr. 850].
Personal Jurisdiction
While subject matter jurisdiction is the authority of a court to try particular types of actions, personal jurisdiction addresses whether a court may exercise jurisdiction over a person that is either 1) within the state, or 2) if not in the state, that the person has "certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice;" and that the person's due process rights are protected by giving sufficient notice of the action and an opportunity to be heard [see Code Civ. Proc. § 410.10; International Shoe Co. v. Washington (1945) 326 U.S. 310, 66 S. Ct. 154, 90 L. Ed. 95].
Jurisdiction Required for Valid Judgment
The jurisdiction sufficient to sustain a record is jurisdiction over the cause, over the parties, and over the thing, when a specific thing is the subject of the judgment [Code Civ. Proc. § 1917]. Thus, the judgment of a court lacking this jurisdiction is void.
In other words, a court, in order to exercise jurisdiction over a given action or proceeding, must have jurisdiction over the subject matter, that is, the constitutional and statutory power to adjudicate the matter in controversy [see Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal (1941) 17 Cal. 2d 280, 291 109 P.2d 942; Harrington v. Superior Court (1924) 194 Cal. 185, 188, 228 P. 15; Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd. v. Small Claims Court (1973) 35 Cal. App. 3d 643, 645, 111 Cal. Rptr. 6]. Subject matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent, waiver or estoppel [Buckley v. California Coastal Com. (1998) 68 Cal. App. 4th 178, 190, 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d 562], nor can parties expand a court's jurisdiction by contract [Crowell v. Downey Community Hospital Foundation (2002) 95 Cal. App. 4th 730, 739, 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d 810].
To exercise jurisdiction over the subject matter, the court must, to render a judgment in personam, secure personal jurisdiction over the defendant [ Titus v. Superior Court (1972) 23 Cal. App. 3d 792, 799, 100 Cal. Rptr. 477] . Thus, in cases involving in personam actions or proceedings, the court must also have jurisdiction over the parties [see Hartford v. Superior Court (1956) 47 Cal. 2d 447, 454, 304 P.2d 1]. To render a judgment in rem or quasi in rem, the court must have jurisdiction over the specific thing that is the subject of the action [see Code Civ. Proc. § 1917].
Jurisdiction Is in Court Rather Than in Judge of Court
Jurisdiction lies in the court and not in a particular judge of the court. Thus, an individual judge, as distinguished from the court, is not empowered to retain jurisdiction of a cause. The cause is before the court, not the individual judge of the court, and the jurisdiction that the judge exercises is the jurisdiction of the court, not of the judge [People v. Osslo (1958) 50 Cal. 2d 75, 103-104, 323 P.2d 397; People v. Madrigal (1995) 37 Cal. App. 4th 791, 795-796, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 498In re Marriage of Regnery (1989) 214 Cal. App. 3d 1367, 1377, 263 Cal. Rptr. 243; see also Sandco American, Inc. v. Notrica (1990) 216 Cal. App. 3d 1495, 1508, 265 Cal. Rptr. 587] .
The jurisdiction of a multijudge, multidepartment superior court is vested in the court as a whole. If one department exercises authority in the matter that might properly be heard in another department, that action, although irregular, does not amount to a defect of jurisdiction [People v. Madrigal (1995) 37 Cal. App. 4th 791, 795, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 498; Shane v. Superior Court (1984) 160 Cal. App. 3d 1237, 1249, 207 Cal. Rptr. 210] . The action, however, may constitute an act in excess of jurisdiction [see, e.g., People v. Malveaux (1997) 50 Cal. App. 4th 1425, 1439, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 371 (when defendant charged, detained, and sentenced in juvenile court before determination was made that defendant was over 18, because the crimes charged were within the jurisdiction of the superior court, they were within the juvenile court's fundamental jurisdiction, but the court's acts were in excess of jurisdiction)].
Similarly, the court rather than an individual judge retains jurisdiction of a cause. Court rules may properly provide that post trial proceeding shall be heard by the judge that tried the matter. An individual judge, however, cannot order that such matters be heard by himself or herself [ People v. Osslo (1958) 50 Cal. 2d 75, 104, 323 P.2d 397 ; People v. Madrigal (1995) 37 Cal. App. 4th 791, 795, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 498; Ayala v. Municipal Court (1982) 137 Cal. App. 3d 484, 487, 187 Cal. Rptr. 75] .
Primary Jurisdiction Doctrine and Administrative Remedies
Under the primary jurisdiction doctrine, a court has discretion to defer ruling on a claim within its original jurisdiction pending an administrative determination of the claim if the interests of justice so require. In exercising this discretion, the court may consider various factors, including the need for administrative expertise and the promotion of uniformity in the application of regulatory law. If, however, a claim is cognizable in the first instance by an agency alone, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies applies rather than the primary jurisdiction doctrine. The exhaustion doctrine is not a matter of judicial discretion, but is a fundamental rule of procedure under which relief must be sought from the administrative body and this remedy exhausted before the courts will act [Economic Empowerment Foundation v. Quackenbush (1997) 57 Cal. App. 4th 677, 683-684, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d 323 (dismissing action for failure to exhaust remedies)].
When a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, the primary jurisdiction doctrine comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires resolution of issues that, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an administrative body. The doctrine does not permanently foreclose judicial action, but provides the appropriate administrative agency with an opportunity to act if it chooses to do so [ Wise v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (1999) 77 Cal. App. 4th 287, 295-296, 298, 91 Cal. Rptr. 2d 479 (doctrine applied)]. Under the doctrine, a court has discretion to defer ruling on a claim within its original jurisdiction pending an administrative determination of the claim if the interests of justice so require [Cundiff v. GTE California Inc. (2002) 101 Cal. App. 4th 1395, 1412-1413, 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 445; Wise v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (1999) 77 Cal. App. 4th 287, 295-296, 298, 91 Cal. Rptr. 2d 479; Economic Empowerment Foundation v. Quackenbush (1997) 57 Cal. App. 4th 677, 683-684, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d 323]. In exercising this discretion, the court may consider various factors, including the need for administrative expertise and the promotion of uniformity in the application of regulatory law [Economic Empowerment Foundation v. Quackenbush (1997) 57 Cal. App. 4th 677, 683-684, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d 323].
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction advances two related policies: it enhances court decisionmaking and efficiency by allowing courts to take advantage of administrative expertise, and it helps assure uniform application of regulatory laws [Aicco, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of North America (2001) 90 Cal. App. 4th 579, 594, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 359, citing Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal. 4th 377, 390-391, 826 P.2d 730] . No rigid formula exists for applying the primary jurisdiction doctrine. Instead, resolution generally hinges on a court's determination of the extent to which the policies noted above are implicated in a given case. This discretionary approach leaves courts with considerable flexibility to avoid application of the doctrine in appropriate situations, as required by interests of justice. [Aicco, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of North America (2001) 90 Cal. App. 4th 579, 594, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 359, citing Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal. 4th 377, 390-391, 826 P.2d 730] .
The proper procedure in applying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is not to dismiss the action, but to stay it pending resolution of the issues within the administrative body's expertise [Southbay Creditors Trust v. General Motors Acceptance Corp. (1999) 69 Cal. App. 4th 1068, 1081, 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1; accord Wise v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (1999) 77 Cal.App. 4th 287, 296, 91 Cal. Rptr. 2d 479] . Thus, the primary jurisdiction doctrine creates a timing issue, not a jurisdictional issue [Piscioneri v. City of Ontario (2002) 95 Cal. App. 4th 1037, 1052-1053, 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d 38, citing Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal. 4th 377, 826 P.2d 730].
The primary jurisdiction doctrine obligates a litigant to apply to an outside regulatory agency for relief before pursuing a civil action. It, like the closely related doctrine of exhaustion of external administrative remedies, arises in the context of complex regulatory schemes utilizing expert administrative agencies. Both doctrines are, in the words of the Supreme Court, essentially doctrines of comity between courts and agencies. They are two sides of the timing coin: Each determines whether an action may be brought in a court or whether an agency proceeding, or further agency proceeding, is necessary [Palmer v. Regents of the University of California (2003) 107 Cal. App. 4th 899, 132 Cal. Rptr. 2d 567].
The primary jurisdiction doctrine contemplates that a ruling issued by an agency is subject to judicial review. When primary jurisdiction is properly invoked, the doctrine requires that the suit be stayed until the agency resolves the issue, whereupon the lawsuit resumes if the agency's resolution (assuming it survives review by whatever court has jurisdiction to review the agency's decisions) has not resolved the entire controversy [Wise v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (2005) 132 Cal. App. 4th 725, 741, 34 Cal. Rptr. 3d 222].
"This is . . . for the average man [and woman] and its purpose is to try to plant in his [and her] head, at the least, a seed of skepticism about the whole legal profession [service], its works and its ways.
* * *
If only the average man could be led to see and know the cold truth about the lawyers and their Law. With the ignorance would go the fear. With the fear would go the respect. Then indeed – and doubtless in orderly fashion too – it would be: —
Jurisdiction [California]
Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction, in its broadest sense, means the power to hear and determine causes. Jurisdiction is generally divided into two components: subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction. Subject matter jurisdiction is the of a court to try actions of the type or class to which a suit belongs. Personal jurisdiction is the authority of a court over parties and properties. Stated another way, subject matter jurisdiction addresses whether a court has the authority to hear a particular type of suit, while personal jurisdiction addresses whether state and federal due process requirements are met based on the person's or property's relationship to the state. The term "jurisdiction" does not have a single, fixed meaning, but has different meanings in different situations [St. Sava Mission Corp. v. Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese (1990) 223 Cal. App. 3d 1354, 1365, 273 Cal. Rptr. 340].The word "jurisdiction," in its judicial sense, means the power to hear and determine causes [Mueller v. Elba Oil Co.(1942) 21 Cal. 2d 188, 206, 130 P.2d 961; Gray v. Hall (1928) 203 Cal. 306, 314-315, 265 P. 246; see also In re Hughes (1911) 159 Cal. 360, 363, 113 P. 684 (jurisdiction, as applied to a particular claim or controversy, is the power to hear and determine that controversy); Crew v. Pratt (1897) 119 Cal. 139, 151, 51 P. 38 (jurisdiction to pronounce judgment or order under Code Civ. Proc. § 1908, relating to conclusiveness and effect of judgment, refers to the court's right or power to adjudicate a point); Ex Parte Bennett (1872) 44 Cal. 84, 88 (jurisdiction is the power to hear and determine, but includes the power to do both, to hear without determining, or to determine without hearing); Burns v. Municipal Court (1961) 195 Cal. App. 2d 596, 599, 16 Cal. Rptr. 64 (jurisdiction is the power of a court to hear and determine, or to act in a certain manner, and is synonymous with the power to render a valid judgment against a person)].
Jurisdiction is, however, a term of large and comprehensive import and embraces every kind of judicial action. Thus, every movement by a court is necessarily the exercise of jurisdiction [Harrington v. Superior Court (1924) 194 Cal. 185, 188, 228 P. 15] . The term embraces a large number of ideas of similar character, some fundamental to the nature of any judicial system, some derived from the requirement of due process, some determined by the constitutional or statutory structure of a particular court, and some based on mere procedural rules originally devised for convenience and efficiency, and by precedent made mandatory and jurisdictional [Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal (1941) 17 Cal. 2d 280, 291 109 P.2d 942] .
Lack of Jurisdiction
Lack of jurisdiction in its most fundamental or strict sense means an entire absence of power to hear or determine a case; an absence of authority over either the subject matter or over the parties or over both the subject matter and the parties [see Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal (1941) 17 Cal. 2d 280, 287-288, 109 P.2d 942; In re Jody R. (1990) 218 Cal. App. 3d 1615, 1622, 267 Cal. Rptr. 746; People v. Ruiz (1990) 217 Cal. App. 3d 574, 584, 265 Cal. Rptr. 886; Schwenke v. J & P Scott, Inc. (1988) 205 Cal. App. 3d 71, 76, 252 Cal. Rptr. 91], or over the thing, when a specific thing is the subject of the action [see Code Civ. Proc. § 1917].
Excess of Jurisdiction
Excess of jurisdiction refers to a situation in which a court has jurisdiction in the fundamental sense over the subject matter and the parties, but exercises that jurisdiction in an unauthorized manner, that is, in excess of the authority possessed [see Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal (1941) 17 Cal. 2d 280, 291 109 P.2d 942; In re Jody R. (1990) 218 Cal. App. 3d 1615, 1622, 267 Cal. Rptr. 746; People v. Ruiz (1990) 217 Cal. App. 3d 574, 584, 265 Cal. Rptr. 886; Jones v. World Life Research Institute (1976) 60 Cal. App. 3d 836, 846, 131 Cal. Rptr. 674; see also People v. National Automobile & Casualty Co. (2000) 82 Cal. App. 4th 120, 125-126, 97 Cal. Rptr. 2d 858; Lovett v. Carrasco (1998) 63 Cal. App. 4th 48, 54-55, 73 Cal. Rptr. 2d 496]. For example, a court may grant relief that it is not authorized to grant, or it may act in the absence of certain procedural prerequisites. Such acts are strictly in excess of jurisdiction, although in common usage they are frequently not distinguished from acts in which the court wholly lacks jurisdiction [see Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal (1941) 17 Cal. 2d 280, 288, 109 P.2d 942; People v. Nat'l Automobile and Casualty Ins. Co. (2000) 82 Cal. App. 4th 120, 125, 97 Cal. Rptr. 2d 858; Jovine v. FHP, Inc. (1998) 64 Cal. App. 4th 1506, 1527 n.26, 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d 322; see also Crittenden v. Superior Court (1964) 61 Cal. 2d 565, 567, 39 Cal. Rptr. 380, 393 P.2d 692; Schwenke v. J & P Scott, Inc. (1988) 205 Cal. App. 3d 71, 76, 252 Cal. Rptr. 91 ; compare Jovine v. FHP, Inc. (1998) 64 Cal. App. 4th 1506, 1527, 1531-1532, 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d 322 (while it is not uncommon for cases to state that act in excess of court's jurisdiction is void, only acts in excess of subject matter jurisdiction are void, while acts in excess of other kinds of jurisdiction are voidable) with Plaza Hollister Ltd. Partnership v. County of San Benito (1999) 72 Cal. App. 4th 1, 20, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 715 (granting relief that court under no circumstances has any authority to grant has been considered an aspect of fundamental jurisdiction for purposes of declaring a judgment or order void)].
Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Subject matter jurisdiction has been defined as the authority of a court to try actions of the type or class to which a suit belongs. A question of subject matter jurisdiction necessarily involves choice of forum: since all legally cognizable grievances may be considered in some forum, a claim that a particular agency has or does not have authority to adjudicate a case inevitably implies that another court or agency does not have or does have such power [Hughes v. Blue Cross of Northern California (1989) 215 Cal. App. 3d 832, 849, 263 Cal. Rptr. 850].
Personal Jurisdiction
While subject matter jurisdiction is the authority of a court to try particular types of actions, personal jurisdiction addresses whether a court may exercise jurisdiction over a person that is either 1) within the state, or 2) if not in the state, that the person has "certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice;" and that the person's due process rights are protected by giving sufficient notice of the action and an opportunity to be heard [see Code Civ. Proc. § 410.10; International Shoe Co. v. Washington (1945) 326 U.S. 310, 66 S. Ct. 154, 90 L. Ed. 95].
Jurisdiction Required for Valid Judgment
The jurisdiction sufficient to sustain a record is jurisdiction over the cause, over the parties, and over the thing, when a specific thing is the subject of the judgment [Code Civ. Proc. § 1917]. Thus, the judgment of a court lacking this jurisdiction is void.
In other words, a court, in order to exercise jurisdiction over a given action or proceeding, must have jurisdiction over the subject matter, that is, the constitutional and statutory power to adjudicate the matter in controversy [see Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal (1941) 17 Cal. 2d 280, 291 109 P.2d 942; Harrington v. Superior Court (1924) 194 Cal. 185, 188, 228 P. 15; Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd. v. Small Claims Court (1973) 35 Cal. App. 3d 643, 645, 111 Cal. Rptr. 6]. Subject matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent, waiver or estoppel [Buckley v. California Coastal Com. (1998) 68 Cal. App. 4th 178, 190, 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d 562], nor can parties expand a court's jurisdiction by contract [Crowell v. Downey Community Hospital Foundation (2002) 95 Cal. App. 4th 730, 739, 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d 810].
To exercise jurisdiction over the subject matter, the court must, to render a judgment in personam, secure personal jurisdiction over the defendant [ Titus v. Superior Court (1972) 23 Cal. App. 3d 792, 799, 100 Cal. Rptr. 477] . Thus, in cases involving in personam actions or proceedings, the court must also have jurisdiction over the parties [see Hartford v. Superior Court (1956) 47 Cal. 2d 447, 454, 304 P.2d 1]. To render a judgment in rem or quasi in rem, the court must have jurisdiction over the specific thing that is the subject of the action [see Code Civ. Proc. § 1917].
Jurisdiction Is in Court Rather Than in Judge of Court
Jurisdiction lies in the court and not in a particular judge of the court. Thus, an individual judge, as distinguished from the court, is not empowered to retain jurisdiction of a cause. The cause is before the court, not the individual judge of the court, and the jurisdiction that the judge exercises is the jurisdiction of the court, not of the judge [People v. Osslo (1958) 50 Cal. 2d 75, 103-104, 323 P.2d 397; People v. Madrigal (1995) 37 Cal. App. 4th 791, 795-796, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 498 In re Marriage of Regnery (1989) 214 Cal. App. 3d 1367, 1377, 263 Cal. Rptr. 243; see also Sandco American, Inc. v. Notrica (1990) 216 Cal. App. 3d 1495, 1508, 265 Cal. Rptr. 587] .
The jurisdiction of a multijudge, multidepartment superior court is vested in the court as a whole. If one department exercises authority in the matter that might properly be heard in another department, that action, although irregular, does not amount to a defect of jurisdiction [People v. Madrigal (1995) 37 Cal. App. 4th 791, 795, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 498; Shane v. Superior Court (1984) 160 Cal. App. 3d 1237, 1249, 207 Cal. Rptr. 210] . The action, however, may constitute an act in excess of jurisdiction [see, e.g., People v. Malveaux (1997) 50 Cal. App. 4th 1425, 1439, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 371 (when defendant charged, detained, and sentenced in juvenile court before determination was made that defendant was over 18, because the crimes charged were within the jurisdiction of the superior court, they were within the juvenile court's fundamental jurisdiction, but the court's acts were in excess of jurisdiction)].
Similarly, the court rather than an individual judge retains jurisdiction of a cause. Court rules may properly provide that post trial proceeding shall be heard by the judge that tried the matter. An individual judge, however, cannot order that such matters be heard by himself or herself [ People v. Osslo (1958) 50 Cal. 2d 75, 104, 323 P.2d 397 ; People v. Madrigal (1995) 37 Cal. App. 4th 791, 795, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 498; Ayala v. Municipal Court (1982) 137 Cal. App. 3d 484, 487, 187 Cal. Rptr. 75] .
Jurisdiction to Determine Jurisdiction
Although a court may not act in a matter over which it has no jurisdiction, it has jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction [Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal (1941) 17 Cal. 2d 280, 302-303, 109 P.2d 942; Ziller Electronics Lab GmbH v. Superior Court (1988) 206 Cal. App. 3d 1222, 1228, 254 Cal. Rptr. 410] . Thus, a court has inherent power to inquire into its jurisdiction of a matter on its own motion, regardless of whether the issue is raised by the litigants. The power of inquiry rests partially on the theory that until the court determines that it has jurisdiction and does some act in consequence, there can be no injury to the party who denies its jurisdiction. The exercise of jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction is a preliminary step, not a final one, and no interference in the tribunal's inquiry is permitted. However, once a court decides that it has jurisdiction, then any subsequent act is always subject to inquiry by a higher court [Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal (1941) 17 Cal. 2d 280, 302-303, 109 P. 2d 942; see Bernardi v. City Council (1997) 54 Cal. App. 4th 426, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 347]. That is, once the determination is made, the question is no longer one of jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction, but, rather, one of jurisdiction to act, and, if the court acts, its action is subject to review by a higher court [Harden v. Superior Court (1955) 44 Cal. 2d 630, 634, 284 P.2d 9; Housing Authority v. Superior Court (1950) 35 Cal. 2d 550, 557, 219 P.2d 457].
Primary Jurisdiction Doctrine and Administrative Remedies
Under the primary jurisdiction doctrine, a court has discretion to defer ruling on a claim within its original jurisdiction pending an administrative determination of the claim if the interests of justice so require. In exercising this discretion, the court may consider various factors, including the need for administrative expertise and the promotion of uniformity in the application of regulatory law. If, however, a claim is cognizable in the first instance by an agency alone, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies applies rather than the primary jurisdiction doctrine. The exhaustion doctrine is not a matter of judicial discretion, but is a fundamental rule of procedure under which relief must be sought from the administrative body and this remedy exhausted before the courts will act [Economic Empowerment Foundation v. Quackenbush (1997) 57 Cal. App. 4th 677, 683-684, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d 323 (dismissing action for failure to exhaust remedies)].
When a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, the primary jurisdiction doctrine comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires resolution of issues that, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an administrative body. The doctrine does not permanently foreclose judicial action, but provides the appropriate administrative agency with an opportunity to act if it chooses to do so [ Wise v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (1999) 77 Cal. App. 4th 287, 295-296, 298, 91 Cal. Rptr. 2d 479 (doctrine applied)]. Under the doctrine, a court has discretion to defer ruling on a claim within its original jurisdiction pending an administrative determination of the claim if the interests of justice so require [Cundiff v. GTE California Inc. (2002) 101 Cal. App. 4th 1395, 1412-1413, 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 445; Wise v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (1999) 77 Cal. App. 4th 287, 295-296, 298, 91 Cal. Rptr. 2d 479; Economic Empowerment Foundation v. Quackenbush (1997) 57 Cal. App. 4th 677, 683-684, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d 323]. In exercising this discretion, the court may consider various factors, including the need for administrative expertise and the promotion of uniformity in the application of regulatory law [Economic Empowerment Foundation v. Quackenbush (1997) 57 Cal. App. 4th 677, 683-684, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d 323].
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction advances two related policies: it enhances court decisionmaking and efficiency by allowing courts to take advantage of administrative expertise, and it helps assure uniform application of regulatory laws [Aicco, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of North America (2001) 90 Cal. App. 4th 579, 594, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 359, citing Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal. 4th 377, 390-391, 826 P.2d 730] . No rigid formula exists for applying the primary jurisdiction doctrine. Instead, resolution generally hinges on a court's determination of the extent to which the policies noted above are implicated in a given case. This discretionary approach leaves courts with considerable flexibility to avoid application of the doctrine in appropriate situations, as required by interests of justice. [Aicco, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of North America (2001) 90 Cal. App. 4th 579, 594, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 359, citing Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal. 4th 377, 390-391, 826 P.2d 730] .
The proper procedure in applying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is not to dismiss the action, but to stay it pending resolution of the issues within the administrative body's expertise [Southbay Creditors Trust v. General Motors Acceptance Corp. (1999) 69 Cal. App. 4th 1068, 1081, 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1; accord Wise v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (1999) 77 Cal.App. 4th 287, 296, 91 Cal. Rptr. 2d 479] . Thus, the primary jurisdiction doctrine creates a timing issue, not a jurisdictional issue [Piscioneri v. City of Ontario (2002) 95 Cal. App. 4th 1037, 1052-1053, 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d 38, citing Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal. 4th 377, 826 P.2d 730].
The primary jurisdiction doctrine obligates a litigant to apply to an outside regulatory agency for relief before pursuing a civil action. It, like the closely related doctrine of exhaustion of external administrative remedies, arises in the context of complex regulatory schemes utilizing expert administrative agencies. Both doctrines are, in the words of the Supreme Court, essentially doctrines of comity between courts and agencies. They are two sides of the timing coin: Each determines whether an action may be brought in a court or whether an agency proceeding, or further agency proceeding, is necessary [Palmer v. Regents of the University of California (2003) 107 Cal. App. 4th 899, 132 Cal. Rptr. 2d 567].
The primary jurisdiction doctrine contemplates that a ruling issued by an agency is subject to judicial review. When primary jurisdiction is properly invoked, the doctrine requires that the suit be stayed until the agency resolves the issue, whereupon the lawsuit resumes if the agency's resolution (assuming it survives review by whatever court has jurisdiction to review the agency's decisions) has not resolved the entire controversy [Wise v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (2005) 132 Cal. App. 4th 725, 741, 34 Cal. Rptr. 3d 222].
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